It’s a chain
With DKIM there is one signature, from the origin. With DKIM2, every
system that handles a message adds a DKIM2-Signature, and
each new signature covers all the earlier ones: i=1,
i=2, i=3… A verifier can walk the
chain and see the whole path the message took.
If nobody changes the message, every signature covers the same
Message-Instance (m=1): a sender, a
forwarding service and a corporate gateway each add a signature, and
all three sign the same unchanged message.
Not trust — accountability
DKIM2 doesn’t tell you who to trust. A valid signature
doesn’t mean a message is good; it means that domain put its name
to what it did with it. Each signature records who signed
(d=), the envelope it sent with (mf= sender,
rt= recipients), when (t=), and whether it fanned the
message out to more than one recipient (f=exploded). Each
Message-Instance records exactly what that hop changed.
-
brand.example
sent to list@lists.example
changed — (original)
-
lists.example
sent to 1,200 members
flag exploded
changed tag + footer
-
alumni.example
sent to alice@isp.example
changed nothing
-
Inbox
checks every hop
judges each on its own record
Message-Instance: changes are written down
When a hop changes a message it keeps the earlier
Message-Instance and adds a new one, with a fresh hash of
the message as it is now and a recipe (r=) that
rebuilds the previous version. Here a corporate gateway adds
[EXTERNAL] to the subject:
Original send
Subject: Updated project timeline
Please review the updated timeline.
Message-Instance: m=1; h=…
Header and body fingerprints.
After the corporate gateway
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Updated project timeline
Please review the updated timeline.
Message-Instance: m=1; h=… Message-Instance: m=2; h=…; r=…
New header hash · same body hash ·
the recipe (r=) restores the original subject.
Because the original can be rebuilt, the original sender’s signature can be checked again, and every change is pinned to the hop that made it. A mailing list no longer has to pretend to be the author: its subject tag and footer are on its own record.
A hop that makes significant changes becomes the message’s author, and must put its own From on it. (Proposed for the next draft; not yet in the specification.) Either way the message would say who is responsible for it: small changes recorded against whoever made them, and a message rewritten in earnest from whoever rewrote it.
The envelope travels signed
Each DKIM2-Signature records the SMTP envelope —
MAIL FROM and RCPT TO — and signs it. A
verifier checks the envelope it actually received against what was
signed.
- A captured message can’t be re-aimed
→ DKIM replay stops working. A hop that sends to more than one
recipient must say so with
f=exploded, another replay signal. - Bounces know exactly where to go → no more backscatter. Each hop promises to carry delivery notifications and other control messages back to the previous hop for a reasonable time, so a bounce travels back along the authenticated chain.
- Stripping signatures doesn’t rewind the clock → to resend an “earlier copy” you’d have to sign as the domain it was addressed to.
Required domain matches
The core specification requires two domain matches. For the
envelope, the MAIL FROM domain must be the signing domain
(d=) or a subdomain of it. For the header, an Authentic
From also matches the other way: a signer at a subdomain
can vouch for its parent domain’s From, unless the
parent publishes a Domain Policy Record (f=strict) that
forbids it.
| ✓ | mf=…@example.com | exact |
| ✓ | mf=…@bounce.example.com | subdomain |
| ✗ | mf=…@notexample.com | different domain |
| ✗ | mf=…@example.com.evil.net | not a subdomain |
| ✓ | From: news@example.com | exact |
| ✓ | From: news@mail.example.com | subdomain |
| ✓ | From: news@example.com with d=mail.example.com | parent domain, unless it forbids subdomain signing |
| ✗ | From: news@other.example | different domain |
| ✗ | From: a@x.com, b@y.com | multiple addresses |
Which signature is the From checked against? The first
(i=1) — or, if a hop rewrote the From,
the first signature after that change.
Signature flags
Each hop can set flags in f=: what it’s asking
for, or what it did.
f=feedback— the signer asks for feedback on how its mail was handled. The report format is still being worked out.f=feedhere— relay feedback through this hop, rather than straight to the originator, protecting the identity of systems further down the chain.f=exploded— this hop sent one message on to more than one recipient; a key signal for spotting replay. Never set oni=1.
Flags a verifier doesn’t recognise are ignored, so more can be added later.
Swap crypto without a flag day
A DKIM2-Signature can carry several algorithms at once,
and verifiers ignore the ones they don’t understand. Sign with
the old and the new algorithm together, let receivers verify whichever
they support, and retire the old one once adoption is there.
Defined today: RSA-SHA256 ·
Ed25519-SHA256 · ML-DSA-44
(post-quantum).
What it looks like — and your keys
Two new header fields: Message-Instance documents the
message and any changes; DKIM2-Signature carries the
signature and the signed envelope.
It reuses your existing DKIM keys. DKIM2 keys live
in the same _domainkey place in the DNS, in the same TXT
record format, so your RSA keys work as they are: no new DNS to make
DKIM2 work. Ed25519 or ML-DSA later means a new selector, and is
optional.
Debugging with X-DKIM2-Info
The biggest lesson from interop testing: when a signature
doesn’t verify, the first questions are always “what did
you sign?” and “which draft did you build?”.
X-DKIM2-Info is an optional diagnostic header that
answers both up front. This one is from the Mailman integration on
this host:
X-DKIM2-Info: draft=ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09; repo=github.com/brong/mailman;
date=2026-11-03; sw=mailman; action=mi-m=2; hc=16;
hn=content-transfer-encoding,content-type,date,from,list-help,list-id,
list-owner,list-post,list-subscribe,list-unsubscribe,message-id,
message-id-hash,mime-version,precedence,subject,to;
draft=— the spec version the software was built againstsw=andaction=— which software touched it, and what it didhc=andhn=— exactly which header fields went into the hash
Optional and for diagnosis only; defined in draft-gondwana-dkim2-debug-header.