How it works

A chain of signatures, every change written down, and the envelope signed into the message — so every part of a message can be attributed to whoever wrote or changed it.

It’s a chain

With DKIM there is one signature, from the origin. With DKIM2, every system that handles a message adds a DKIM2-Signature, and each new signature covers all the earlier ones: i=1, i=2, i=3… A verifier can walk the chain and see the whole path the message took.

If nobody changes the message, every signature covers the same Message-Instance (m=1): a sender, a forwarding service and a corporate gateway each add a signature, and all three sign the same unchanged message.

Not trust — accountability

DKIM2 doesn’t tell you who to trust. A valid signature doesn’t mean a message is good; it means that domain put its name to what it did with it. Each signature records who signed (d=), the envelope it sent with (mf= sender, rt= recipients), when (t=), and whether it fanned the message out to more than one recipient (f=exploded). Each Message-Instance records exactly what that hop changed.

  1. brand.example

    sent to list@lists.example

    changed — (original)

  2. lists.example

    sent to 1,200 members

    flag exploded

    changed tag + footer

  3. alumni.example

    sent to alice@isp.example

    changed nothing

  4. Inbox

    checks every hop

    judges each on its own record

Every hop is on the record — so reputation lands on whoever actually did it.

Message-Instance: changes are written down

When a hop changes a message it keeps the earlier Message-Instance and adds a new one, with a fresh hash of the message as it is now and a recipe (r=) that rebuilds the previous version. Here a corporate gateway adds [EXTERNAL] to the subject:

Original send

Subject: Updated project timeline

Please review the updated timeline.

Message-Instance: m=1; h=…

Header and body fingerprints.

After the corporate gateway

Subject: [EXTERNAL] Updated project timeline

Please review the updated timeline.

Message-Instance: m=1; h=…
Message-Instance: m=2; h=…; r=…

New header hash · same body hash · the recipe (r=) restores the original subject.

Rebuild the original → earlier signatures verify again, and every change is attributable.

Because the original can be rebuilt, the original sender’s signature can be checked again, and every change is pinned to the hop that made it. A mailing list no longer has to pretend to be the author: its subject tag and footer are on its own record.

A hop that makes significant changes becomes the message’s author, and must put its own From on it. (Proposed for the next draft; not yet in the specification.) Either way the message would say who is responsible for it: small changes recorded against whoever made them, and a message rewritten in earnest from whoever rewrote it.

The envelope travels signed

Each DKIM2-Signature records the SMTP envelope — MAIL FROM and RCPT TO — and signs it. A verifier checks the envelope it actually received against what was signed.

Required domain matches

The core specification requires two domain matches. For the envelope, the MAIL FROM domain must be the signing domain (d=) or a subdomain of it. For the header, an Authentic From also matches the other way: a signer at a subdomain can vouch for its parent domain’s From, unless the parent publishes a Domain Policy Record (f=strict) that forbids it.

Envelope: MAIL FROM vs d=example.com
✓mf=…@example.comexact
✓mf=…@bounce.example.comsubdomain
✗mf=…@notexample.comdifferent domain
✗mf=…@example.com.evil.netnot a subdomain
Header: an Authentic From vs d=example.com
✓From: news@example.comexact
✓From: news@mail.example.comsubdomain
✓From: news@example.com with d=mail.example.comparent domain, unless it forbids subdomain signing
✗From: news@other.exampledifferent domain
✗From: a@x.com, b@y.commultiple addresses

Which signature is the From checked against? The first (i=1) — or, if a hop rewrote the From, the first signature after that change.

Signature flags

Each hop can set flags in f=: what it’s asking for, or what it did.

Flags a verifier doesn’t recognise are ignored, so more can be added later.

Swap crypto without a flag day

A DKIM2-Signature can carry several algorithms at once, and verifiers ignore the ones they don’t understand. Sign with the old and the new algorithm together, let receivers verify whichever they support, and retire the old one once adoption is there.

Defined today: RSA-SHA256 · Ed25519-SHA256 · ML-DSA-44 (post-quantum).

What it looks like — and your keys

Two new header fields: Message-Instance documents the message and any changes; DKIM2-Signature carries the signature and the signed envelope.

It reuses your existing DKIM keys. DKIM2 keys live in the same _domainkey place in the DNS, in the same TXT record format, so your RSA keys work as they are: no new DNS to make DKIM2 work. Ed25519 or ML-DSA later means a new selector, and is optional.

Debugging with X-DKIM2-Info

The biggest lesson from interop testing: when a signature doesn’t verify, the first questions are always “what did you sign?” and “which draft did you build?”. X-DKIM2-Info is an optional diagnostic header that answers both up front. This one is from the Mailman integration on this host:

X-DKIM2-Info: draft=ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-09; repo=github.com/brong/mailman;
   date=2026-11-03; sw=mailman; action=mi-m=2; hc=16;
   hn=content-transfer-encoding,content-type,date,from,list-help,list-id,
      list-owner,list-post,list-subscribe,list-unsubscribe,message-id,
      message-id-hash,mime-version,precedence,subject,to;

Optional and for diagnosis only; defined in draft-gondwana-dkim2-debug-header.