Work in progress · IETF Internet-Draft

Shrink the grey area.

DKIM2 is the next version of DKIM. Every system that handles an email signs for what it did, so legitimate mail can prove it’s from who it says it’s from — and every change along the way is on the record.

How it works → Try it Who’s using it

Today, a lot of legitimate mail is impossible to tell apart from abuse.

TODAY
Clearly good Grey: can’t tell Clearly bad

forwarding · mailing lists · Bcc · replayed signatures · forged bounces

WITH DKIM2
Clearly good Grey Clearly bad

The goal: move legitimate mail out of the grey area — so anything still there can be treated as bad.

Proportions are illustrative.

Good means: from who it says it’s from, with every change attributable to whoever made it.

Forwarding, mailing lists, Bcc and bounces are legitimate, but today they look just like the tricks abusers use: replayed signatures, forged bounces, spoofed From addresses. Receivers have to guess, and both good and bad mail get caught. DKIM2 gives each legitimate use a clear, verifiable way to do what it does — forwarders sign, lists record their changes, each Bcc copy is signed for the recipient it was sent to, bounces follow the chain — so it leaves the grey area.

Four things you can’t verify today

  1. Who the message was for. You can receive legitimate mail with no proof you were the intended recipient — that’s how Bcc works. So a validly signed message can be captured and replayed to huge numbers of other people, riding on the signer’s good reputation.
  2. Whether a bounce is safe to send. Once the SMTP connection has closed you can’t tell a real sender from a forged one, so bounces get scattered onto innocent parties (“backscatter”).
  3. What changed in transit. When a forwarder or list edits a message, the signature simply breaks; you can’t tell new content from the original. So mailing lists rewrite the From into their own domain and start again.
  4. Whether you can move to new crypto. Nobody can rely on a new signing algorithm until everyone verifies it, so there’s no safe path to stronger, or post-quantum, algorithms.

The first two share a root cause: the SMTP envelope (MAIL FROM and RCPT TO) is never authenticated.

DKIM2 fixes all four

Not trust — accountability. None of this makes a message trustworthy. DKIM2 doesn’t tell you who to trust; it records who did what at every step, so reputation lands on whoever actually did it. The rationale is set out in the DKIM2 motivation draft (background; now expired).

Where the work is

DKIM2 is being developed in the re-chartered IETF DKIM working group. It is an active Internet-Draft, not yet a finished standard — details may still change. We expect it to become what the large mailbox providers require.

Working-group draftRevisionWhat it is
dkim2-spec-09The core specification
dkim2-bcp-01Best practices
dkim2-dns-03Key records in the DNS
Related individual draftRevisionWhat it is
dkim2-authres-02DKIM2 results in Authentication-Results
dkim2-debug-header-03X-DKIM2-Info diagnostics for interop
dkim2-sender-policy-04DMARC policy for DKIM2

It is already running on real mail: see who has deployed DKIM2, and the independent implementations that interoperate.

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